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Abstract—A community microgrid is a microgrid composed
of several entities, or members, that can share energy among
themselves. The members of the community can match their
demand and supply through an internal local market with a
significant reduction of the exchanges with the main grid. As a
consequence each participant can benefit from a reduction of its
energy costs when the energy available locally is cheaper than the
energy from the grid, from a drop of the energy peak demanded
from the main grid, and from the new capability to provide
energy reserve at aggregate level. In this paper, we analyze
how the changes of the community market model parameters
can affect both the community as a whole, and the welfare of
each participant. The analysis is performed by varying the main
drivers of the community market model, the community and
storage fees, and the storage capacity. The numerical results are
obtained by using real data based on the MeryGrid project.
Index Terms—community market, community microgrid, en-
ergy market, marginal pricing, sharing economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing share of renewable energy sources and
storage systems in distribution grids opens the possibility for
new market models that favor a local usage of the generated
electricity. Local energy communities, and more specifically
community microgrids, constitute one of these options. A
microgrid is a set of loads, generators and storage devices
connected by an electric grid within a clearly defined neigh-
borhood, able to work either connected or disconnected from
the main grid. It becomes a community microgrid when several
legal entities constitute the microgrid, e.g. a set of small and
medium-sized enterprises.
In the literature, microgrids have been explored under differ-
ent aspects, however references related to community market
models are limited. Reference [1] shows how to model and
price co-generated energy within a local heat district, managed
by a monopolistic public utility. Reference [2] proposes a
microgrid model with internal exchanges formalized as a Nash
bargaining problem, where the community prices are restricted
to predetermined, discrete price levels. Reference [3] describes
a community model where the participating units act in a
collaborative manner. The optimal solution is obtained through
a distributed algorithm by exploiting the alternating direction
method of multipliers. Reference [4] presents a blockchain-
based microgrid based on a pilot project built in Brooklyn,
where blockchains appear to be an eligible technology to
manage local microgrids. Reference [5] reviews and analyzes
the most important market architectures for community micro-
grid, including decentralized peer-to-peer structures with direct
trades among participants, and local community of aggregated
units either connected to the main grid or islanded. Reference
[6] proposes a peer-to-peer microgrid model where the internal
community prices are determined heuristically depending on
the ratio between the energy supplied and demanded within the
community. Reference [7] describes a novel market model for
community microgrids that is formalized as a bilevel problem.
By using the proposed architecture, the community partici-
pants can allocate efficiently their resources with a significant
reduction of the energy costs. Furthermore, the entities can
pool their resources to provide ancillary services to the main
grid. Moreover, by exploiting the netting effects at aggregate
level, they can reduce the energy imported from the main grid,
with a considerable drop in the energy peak costs. By using
predetermined profit and cost sharing policies, a community
operator ensures no participating entity is penalized.
The aim of this paper is to perform an in-depth sensitivity
analysis, by measuring the effects of changing the main param-
eters of the community microgrid market model introduced in
[7], in order to assess the soundness, reliability, and robustness
of the proposed market architecture. In particular, we focus on
the change of welfare for
• the community and community members,
• the storage owners,
• the community operator.
The analysis is performed by varying the following parame-
ters:
• the fee collected by the storage owner,
• the fee collected by the community operator to manage
the community,
• the amount of storage capacity available.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II briefly summarizes the model proposed in [7].
Section III describes the analysis performed and reports the
numerical results. Finally, Section IV outlines the main con-
clusions.
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Fig. 1. Schematic community model. The flow ecomi (resp. i
com
i ) represents
the export (resp. import) of entity i to the community. Flows tagged by ”gri”
denote traditional exchanges with the public grid.
II. MODEL SUMMARY
This section briefly summarizes the market model for com-
munity microgrid described in [7]. The proposed architecture
considers the entities forming the community, and a commu-
nity operator that manages the community in the best interest
of the participants. Collectively, the entities decide both the
quantity to trade among themselves within the community,
and the quantity to trade outside of the community directly
with the main grid. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The market clearing at community level is performed by
matching the demand and supply orders of each entity through
a social welfare maximization problem. As a result, a market
equilibrium is determined, where the executed quantity and
the market prices are identified. By using the community, the
entities can achieve a more efficient allocation of the resources,
and therefore a reduction of the energy costs. Furthermore, as
a group, the entities are able to provide energy reserve to the
main grid and are able to effectively reduce the community en-
ergy peak, due to the import/export netting effect at aggregate
level. Notice however that both the reserve provision and the
community peak reduction are results of a collective effort.
Therefore, some policy rules, and an independent operator
(the community operator) are needed in order to determine
how these benefits should be shared among the participating
entities. Thus, given the market clearing results, a community
operator must apply predetermined sharing policies in order to
split the collective revenues and costs among each participant.
An operator fee is considered to remunerate the activity of the
community operator1. Similarly, storage device owners collect
a battery fee each time their devices are used.
A bilevel model has been implemented in order to model
this architecture. A bilevel model consists of two nested
optimization problems, termed upper and lower level problems
1Note that it is assumed that the community operator has a contract with
the DSO, since the community exploits the public grid for the physical flows.














Enforce Reserve Sharing Policy
Enforce Peak Sharing Policy
Ensure Pareto Condition
Fig. 2. The bilevel model structure. The lower level problem determines
both the market equilibrium within the community, and the exchanges with
the main grid. The upper level problem represents the community operator.
[8]. This structure can be sketched as follows:
max
u∈U
F (u, x∗) (1)
s.t. x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈X
f(x;u) , (2)
where F is the objective function of the upper level, and f
is the objective function of the lower level. In the proposed
community microgrid model with internal market, the lower
level part clears the community market by determining the
executed quantities and the market prices, whereas the upper
level acts as an independent community operator that applies
the sharing policies, and ensures that no entity is penalized
by participating in the community. The latter requirement is
termed Pareto superior condition, and it is a fundamental
condition in order to ensure a participation on a voluntary
basis. Monetary compensations within the community are
allowed. The overall process is sketched in Fig. 2.
A key feature of the proposed model is that the lower level
problem is a linear program. By exploiting this characteristic,
the lower level can be directly represented within the upper
level by using its first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions,
obtaining a single optimization problem equivalent to the
initial bilevel model.
III. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the
proposed bilevel model on the following parameters: the com-
munity operator fee, the storage owner fee, and the capacity of
the storage system. The purpose is two-fold: first to assess how
different values of the parameters can affect the community
and each participant; second to find a good value for each of
these parameters.
We conduct this study on a realistic test case inspired by the
MeryGrid project [9]. The MeryGrid project is a community
microgrid composed of four entities. The first entity is a pure
consumer. Entities 2 and 3 are both consumers and producers,
TABLE I
MEAN (µ), STANDARD DEVIATION (σ), AND MAXIMUM VALUES OF THE
CONSUMPTION AND RENEWABLE GENERATION OF EACH ENTITY AND THE
COMMUNITY RESPECTIVELY IN JANUARY AND IN AUGUST, IN KW.
January August
Entity Type µ σ Max µ σ Max
1 Load 27 30 237 23 29 164
2 Load 39 22 91 7 10 47
2 PV gen. 0 1 26 5 11 67
3 Load 21 37 183 17 36 193
3 Hydro gen. 45 37 116 54 51 183
Total Load 87 61 417 47 58 320
Generation 45 37 123 59 54 224
with respectively 70kWp of PV and 200kVA of hydro-electric
capacity. The last entity, entity 4, is a battery storage system
with a capacity of 270kWh. We use as demand and supply
orders for the model the consumption and renewable genera-
tion of the four entities that were measured every 15 minutes
during the year 2017. We focus on two months, January and
August, chosen to evaluate the impact of some parameters
with different weather conditions. Table I summarizes the
consumption and generation data for these two months. On
average, the consumption is larger in January than in August,
but it is the contrary for the generation.
We consider as fixed the parameters depending on the
contract with the main grid: the peak cost and the prices at
which each entity can buy from and sell to the grid. Their
values are respectively 0.15 e per kW, 0.15 e per kWh and
0.035 e per kWh. Concerning the battery storage system, we
assume that the charging and discharging efficiencies are both
equal to 0.95. Furthermore, the initial and final state of charge
of the battery is equal to half its capacity. One instance of the
problem lasts one day with time steps of 15 minutes. We do
not consider reserves in our test case.
A. Impact of the community operator fee
The operator fee γcom is collected by the community
operator each time an entity buys from or sells to another
entity in the community. In this study, the value of γcom varies
from 0.005 to 0.10 e/kWh with steps of 0.005. All the other
parameters stay constant, in particular the storage owner fee
is equal to 0.04 e/kWh.
Fig. 3 shows the total fees collected by the community
operator during January 2017 as a function of the operator
fee per kWh. The operator revenue increases almost linearly
and reaches the maximum with a tariff of 0.055 e/kWh. With
a larger γcom, no fee is collected, meaning that there are no
exchanges within the community. This analysis shows that
from the community operator’s point of view, the operator
fee should be 0.055 e/kWh to maximize his revenue.
To check if the value of 0.055 e/kWh is meaningful, note
that it is interesting for an entity to sell to the community
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Fig. 3. Total fees paid to the operator during January 2017 as a function of
γcom.
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Fig. 4. Difference in revenue for being in the community compared to being
a single entity during January 2017 as a function of γcom.
instead of the grid only if the community market price is
equal to or larger than the grid purchase price. Thus, the
minimum selling price to the community for an entity is 0.035
e/kWh. In that case, the buying entity has to pay this price
and remunerate the community operator. The selling entity
must also remunerate the community operator. However, in
the proposed framework, the selling entity charges this cost
to the buying entity. Therefore, the latter pays a minimum
of 0.035 + 2 × γcom e/kWh. If this quantity is greater
than 0.15 e/kWh (the grid selling price), that is if γcom
is greater than 0.05825 e/kWh, no entity is willing to buy
from the community, and therefore the selling entity sells to
the grid. This explains the zero revenue for the community
operator for γcom ≥ 0.06 e/kWh. Even though there is
no exchange between entities, Fig. 4 shows that it is still
profitable for each entity to stay in the community, since
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Fig. 5. Total storage fees during January 2017 as a function of γsto for a
storage capacity of 270kWh.
joining the community decreases the peak penalty for the
members. In particular, each entity improves its condition,
and the Pareto condition is thus met. However, adopting a
peak penalty scheme at the community level will likely force
the distribution system operator (DSO) to increase the peak
penalty tariff, which should incentivize community members
to decrease and desynchronize their peak consumptions.
B. Impact of the storage fee
A storage fee per kWh γsto is collected by the battery
owner each time the battery is charged or discharged. In this
work γsto varies from 0 to 0.32 e/kWh with steps of 0.02.
Furthermore, the community operator fee is equal to 0.01
e/kWh.
Fig. 5 shows how the total fees collected by the storage
owner in January evolves with the storage fee per kWh. A
first interesting observation is that it reaches the maximum
value with γsto = 0.04 e/kWh. It is therefore a good choice
for the battery owner to pick this value as storage fee, for the
nominal capacity of the storage system.
After reaching the maximum, the fees collected by the
storage owner do not decrease monotonically. We can explain
this by looking at the use of the battery (the sum of charge and
discharge actions). Fig. 6 shows that it decreases exponentially
as a function of the storage fee per kWh. Therefore, for large
values of γsto, the decrease in the use of the battery does
not compensate the increase of γsto, explaining why the total
storage fees collected by the storage owner increase with γsto.
We notice that the storage system is not exploited anymore
if γsto ≥ 0.32 e/kWh. In fact, it is shown in [7, (39)] that
the community market price picom4,t+n for entity 4 at discharging








0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30


























Fig. 6. Total charge and discharge actions during January 2017 as a function
of γsto for a storage capacity of 270kWh.
where ηcha and ηdis are the charging and discharging effi-
ciencies of the battery, and picom4,t is the market price paid by
entity 4 at time t to charge the battery. This market price is
such that it compensates for the price paid by the battery owner
to charge the battery, and for the losses due to the charging
and discharging efficiencies. It also considers the storage fee.
Notice that, the maximum market price an entity d is willing
to pay, in order to buy electricity within the community, is
capped by the price paid to buy directly from the grid. In this
setting, this value is equal to 0.75 e/kWh2, and it is given by




= 0.75 e/kWh (4)
with the grid selling price piigrd = 0.15 e/kWh, the peak price
pipeak = 0.15 e/kW and ∆T = 0.25 hours. It is therefore
necessary for the market price of entity 4 at discharging
time, i.e. picom4,t+n in (3), to be smaller than 0.75 e/kWh to
be attractive. Assuming a charging price picom4,t equal to its
minimum value, 0.035 e/kWh, this condition is fulfilled only
if γsto < 0.3378, which explains the values observed in both
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
C. Impact of the storage fee and the capacity of the storage
system
We now study simultaneously the impact of the storage
fee per kWh and the capacity of the storage system. For this
analysis, the storage fee per kWh varies as in Section III-B
and the storage capacity varies from 0 to 540 kWh with steps
of 30kWh.
Fig. 7 shows the total fees collected by the battery owner
in January and in August as a function of the capacity of the
battery, for different values of γsto. The capacity of the battery
2Note that this situation occurs only when all entities need to import from
the grid and therefore the battery is used to reduce the maximum peak value
by spreading the import over several time steps.
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Fig. 7. Total storage fees as a function of the storage capacity for various γsto, respectively in January and in August.
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Fig. 8. Difference in revenue for being in the community compared to being a single entity as a function of the storage capacity for γsto= 0.04e/kWh,
respectively in January and in August.
maximizing the owner revenue is very sensitive to the value
γsto. For a large γsto, the current capacity of the community
(270kWh) is too large. This graph corroborates the observation
made in the previous subsection: with γsto = 0.32, the battery
is not used, independently of its capacity.
For both January and August, despite the difference in
consumption and generation profiles, the value of 0.04 for
the storage fee per kWh leads to the maximum revenue for
the storage owner, if the storage capacity is large enough.
Otherwise, there is a clear dependency between the capacity
of the storage unit and the γsto maximizing the owner fees.
Fig. 8 show the difference in revenue for being in the
community compared to being a single entity as a function of
the storage capacity, for γsto = 0.04 e/kWh. The difference
is positive for all entities, due to the Pareto condition. The
difference in revenue for being in the community increases
similarly for all entities when the capacity increases.
The opposite behavior can be observed in Fig. 9 which also
shows the difference in revenue for being in the community,
but this time as a function of γsto.
In both figures, we notice a clear difference between January
and August. It seems that it is more interesting to be in the
community in January, when the consumption is higher than
the production in average.
We see that the entities that make the most of the community
are entity 2 in January and entity 1 in August. They are
the largest consumers in average for the given month and
they seem to exploit well the production surplus of the other
entities.
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Fig. 9. Difference in revenue for being in the community compared to being a single entity as a function of γsto, and for the nominal storage capacity
(270kWh), respectively in January and in August.
IV. CONCLUSION
Community microgrids represent an emerging topic in en-
ergy systems. These new architectures allow participants to
exchange energy and resources among themselves, and to
share the resulting benefits.
By using a novel community microgrid market model,
the proposed sensitivity analysis helps to shed light on how
different parameter settings can affect revenues, costs and
welfare of both the participants and the community as a
whole. Although this does not constitute a proof, the expected
behavior of the system is verified by experiment.
The fee collected by the community operator on each trade
has a significant impact on the community. In particular,
the operator fee can be increased up to the point where no
exchange is worthwhile within the community. Notice that,
the community can be regarded as an hedging tool, where
entities can trade among themselves as long as the internal
community prices are more favorable than the grid prices.
The storage device has a considerable impact on the welfare
of the community, however this effect becomes less evident as
the storage capacity increases.
The reported sensitivity analysis shows that the community
microgrid market model proposed in [7] is a viable framework
for structuring the internal market of a community microgrid,
provided that appropriate values of the main parameters are
selected. There is however not one set of such values that can
be regarded as overall optimal, as the different stakeholders
are guided by different objectives. This highlights the needs
for other criteria to select a good set of values overall. These
criteria could include fairness notions.
Ongoing work aims at extending this evaluation to different
community configurations, and to community of communities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Bertrand Corne´lusse thanks Nethys for its support.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Bohman and R. Andersson, “Pricing cogenerated electricity and heat
in local communities,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 33, no. 3, pp.
333–356, 1987.
[2] D. Zhang, N. J. Samsatli, A. D. Hawkes, D. J. L. Brett, N. Shah, and L. G.
Papageorgiou, “Fair electricity transfer price and unit capacity selection
for microgrids,” Energy Economics, vol. 36, pp. 581–593, 2013.
[3] F. Moret and P. Pinson, “Energy collectives: a community and fairness
based approach to future electricity markets,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, pp. 1–1, 2018.
[4] E. Mengelkamp, J. Grttner, K. Rock, S. Kessler, L. Orsini,
and C. Weinhardt, “Designing microgrid energy markets:
A case study: The brooklyn microgrid,” Applied Energy,
vol. 210, pp. 870 – 880, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030626191730805X
[5] Y. Parag and B. K. Sovacool, “Electricity market design for the prosumer
era,” Nature Energy, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 16032, 2016.
[6] N. Liu, X. Yu, C. Wang, C. Li, L. Ma, and J. Lei, “Energy-sharing
model with price-based demand response for microgrids of peer-to-peer
prosumers,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 5, pp.
3569–3583, Sept 2017.
[7] B. Corne´lusse, I. Savelli, S. Paoletti, A. Giannitrapani, and A. Vicino, “A
community microgrid architecture with an internal local market,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1810.09803, 2018.
[8] J. Bard, Practical bilevel optimization: applications and algorithms.
Kluwer Academic Press Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1998.
[9] B. Corne´lusse, D. Ernst, L. Warichet, and W. Legros, “Efficient manage-
ment of a connected microgrid in belgium,” in Proceedings of the 24th
International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Glasgow, 12-15 June
2017, 2017.
